

BELLSOUTH

Ben G. Almond
Executive Director-
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JUL 25 1996

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July 25, 1996

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
OFFICE OF SECRETARY**

Mr. William F. Caton
Acting Secretary
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, NW, Room 222
Washington, DC 20554

EX PARTE OR LATE FILED

DOCKET FILE COPY ORIGINAL

**RE: CC Docket 96-128 Implementation of The Pay Telephone Reclassification
and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Ex Parte**

Dear Mr. Caton:

In accordance with Section 1.1206 of the Commission's rules, this is to notify you that on July 25, 1996 members and representatives of the RBOC Payphone Coalition met with personnel of the Common Carrier Bureau of the FCC to discuss major issues raised in the above referenced proceeding. Also in attendance was a representative of the United States Telephone Association. The complete list of attendees is provided as an attachment.

The enclosed document was prepared by the Coalition and was used for discussion purposes.

The meeting was held at the encouragement of the FCC staff to achieve mutual benefits of time and productivity efficiencies in discussing the positions of the six companies in the RBOC Payphone Coalition

Please associate this notification and accompanying document with the docket proceeding.

If there are any questions concerning this notification, please contact the undersigned.

Sincerely,



Ben G. Almond
Executive Director-Federal Regulatory

Attachment/Enclosure

cc: FCC Attendees

No. of Copies rec'd 021
List ABCDE

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RBOC Coalition BX Park

7/25/98

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FEDERAL

COMMISSION
OFFICE OF SECRETARY

Name

Co.

THADDEUS MACHCINSKI

FCC

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Miriam Hernandez-Katol

Bellcore

MIKE CRUMING

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David Anastasi

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John B. Muleta FCC Enforcement Division

Aimee Fike SWBT

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Todd Silbergeld SBC Communications Inc.

Michael Kellogg Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans

Dan Lanksbury US WEST

Marylou Shochbey Pacific Bell

Joe Incorvati Bellcore

Frank M. Kennedy USNA

RBOC COALITION FCC PAYPHONE WORKSHOP



**JULY 25, 1996
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

STATEMENT OF VISION

Section 276 provides the overarching goals


- ◆ “Promote competition among payphone service providers”
- ◆ “Promote the widespread deployment of payphone services to the benefit of the general public”
- ◆ Ensure convenient, efficient and affordable service for the public good through competition and widespread deployment

COALITION PRINCIPLES

- ◆ Primacy of Market Forces
- ◆ Regulatory Parity
- ◆ Compensation for All Completed Calls
- ◆ Appropriate Valuation of Assets
- ◆ Structural Flexibility
- ◆ Pricing Flexibility for Semi-public Payphones
- ◆ Public Interest Payphones Fairly Compensated

THE PEOPLE IN MOTION MARKETPLACE

- ◆ Multiple service providers
 - Payphones (LECs, IPPs and Carriers)
 - Wireless (Cellular, Mobile Radio and, in the future, PCS)




Sources: CTIA Wireless Factbook 13 (Spring 1996)

THE PAYPHONE INDUSTRY TODAY

- ◆ More than 15,000 independent PSPs
 - Competition for locations and end user traffic
- ◆ More than 500 toll service providers
 - Competition for payphone toll traffic
 - Large carriers (e.g., 1-800-CALL-ATT, 1-800-COLLECT)
 - Debit cards
- ◆ More than 2 million payphones
- ◆ Estimated RBOC annual revenues of \$2.3 billion

REGULATORY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES YIELD AN INTENSELY COMPETITIVE PAYPHONE INDUSTRY




PAYPHONES AND CALL VOLUMES IN COALITION REGIONS


Coalition Payphones = 1.05 million 74%
 IPP Payphones = 0.37 million 26%

Coalition Volume 4.2 billion 58%
 IPP Volume 3.0 billion 42%


PAYPHONES 1996



CALL VOLUME 1996




DISTRIBUTION OF PAYPHONE CALLS



Source: RBOC Coalition data

TOLL CALL DISTRIBUTION


INTRASTATE



■ 0+
 ■ 1+
 ■ 1-800-SUB
 □ 1-0-XXX
 ■ 1-800-950
 ■ 950
 ■ OTHER

0+	=	20.60%
1+	=	18.30%
1-800-SUB	=	56.50%
1-0-XXX	=	.70%
1-800-950	=	.05%
950	=	3.80%
OTHER	=	.08%

INTERSTATE



0+	=	3.4%
1+	=	2.1%
1-800-SUB	=	90.6%
1-0-XXX	=	.5%
1-800-950	=	1.8%
950	=	1.6%
OTHER	=	.0%

PER CALL COMPENSATION

To ensure fair compensation on all completed calls, except emergency and TRS calls:

- ◆ A default rate should be established for 1+, 0+, dial around and 1-800-subscriber calls
- ◆ The party that receives the primary economic benefit should pay per call compensation to PSPs
- ◆ Tracking should be provided by carriers and 1-800 service providers; alternative tracking methods should be allowed
- ◆ Per call compensation should coincide with the removal of the payphone element of access charges

MARKET-BASED COMPENSATION

- ◆ Transition to market-based per-call compensation -- do not freeze out market forces
- ◆ TOCSIA prevents negotiations because PSPs have no leverage -- default rate restores some leverage
- ◆ A higher default rate will ensure vigorous negotiations and the widespread deployment of payphones
- ◆ Default rate disappears as negotiations become routine

WHAT'S THE DEFAULT RATE?

Per-Call Commission Received by Largest APCC Member	\$0.90
--	--------

<i>Average Per-Call Compensation Assuming Average AT&T Tariffs</i>	<i>\$0.81</i>
--	---------------

Average Non-Coin Per-Call Compensation Received by Three Largest IPPs	\$0.84
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Updated and Revised 0- Transfer Charge Study	\$0.46-\$0.54
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WHO PAYS?

CALL TYPE

PARTY RECEIVING PRIMARY ECONOMIC BENEFIT

Local - Cash

Payphone Service Provider

Local - Non-Cash (OSP)

Operator Service Provider

Local - Non-Cash (Store and Forward)

Payphone Service Provider

Toll - 1+ Cash

Presubscribed or Default Toll Provider

Toll - 0+ Non-Cash

Presubscribed Toll Service Provider

Dial Around

Toll Service Provider

1-800-Subscriber

1-800 Service Provider

1-800 Debit Card

1-800 Service Provider

Store and Forward Toll

Payphone Service Provider

Local Directory Assistance

Payphone Service Provider

Toll Directory Assistance

Toll Service Provider

Emergency/911

No Compensation

Telecommunications Relay Service

No Compensation

WHO TRACKS?

Party receiving primary economic benefit is responsible for tracking


LECs should not be required to track where they do not receive the primary economic benefit

- ◆ LECs cannot track toll calls handled by other toll service providers
- ◆ LECs cannot track completion to called party on 1-800 calls
- ◆ LECs cannot track sequential calls using the “#” sign
- ◆ LECs do not receive the primary economic benefit for PSP calls routed to other toll service providers and should not incur the cost of developing a tracking system

PITFALLS OF USING A COST-BASED APPROACH

- ◆ Cost-based approach does not equal “fair compensation”
- ◆ Cost-based approach does not ensure “widespread deployment” of payphones
- ◆ Cost-based approach ignores widely different costs among PSPs
- ◆ Cost-based approach mandates continuing regulatory intervention

SAMPLE PAYPHONE DISTRIBUTION



This distribution has the characteristic that half the phones have less than the average number of calls per day. In reality, more than half of all phones have less than the average number of calls per day.

SIMPLE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE

Under assumed distribution:

Total number of calls per day = 48

Total Costs = \$44/day*

*assumes

9 phones @ \$4/day

$$(9 \times \$4 = \$36)$$

1(7 calls/day) phone @ \$8/day

$$(1 \times \$8 = \$8)$$

$$(\$36 + \$8 = \$44)$$

Average cost /call ($\$44/48$ calls)=\$0.91

Average calls/day/phone = 4.8

$(\$0.91)(4.8 \text{ calls/day}) = \$4.40 = \text{average cost/phone/day}$

Result:

Phones with less than 4.8 calls/day are removed:

$$2\text{-call phones: } 2 \times .91 = \$1.82 < \$4$$

$$4\text{-call phones: } 4 \times .91 = \$3.64 < \$4$$

High-cost phones with 7 calls/day removed:

$$7\text{-call phone: } 7 \times .91 = \$6.37 < \$8$$

Competitive entry occurs where profitable:

$$10\text{-call phone: } 10 \times .91 = \$9.10 > \$4$$

CONCLUSION

- ◆ “Average” compensation fails to support payphones with:
 - Below-average usage
 - Above-average cost
- ◆ Consequences of cost-based compensation
 - Degradation of service
 - Collapse of product quality
 - “Recipe for bankruptcy”

LOCAL CALL RATE

- ◆ All Coalition members agree that the market, not regulators, should establish the local call rate
- ◆ Three members believe immediate pricing freedom is appropriate
- ◆ Three members believe there should be a period of transition to full pricing freedom

RECLASSIFICATION OF LEC PAYPHONES AS CPE

- ◆ Coin collect and return functionality should be unbundled to the line level
- ◆ Part 68 registration requirements:
 - Embedded base of LEC payphones should be grandfathered
 - Refurbished LEC “dumb” payphones should be grandfathered unless the payphone is modified
- ◆ Demarcation Point
 - All new payphones should be installed consistent with flexible “MPOE” standard
 - Embedded base of LEC payphones should be grandfathered
 - Existing LEC “smart” payphones should be grandfathered with the station protector being the theoretical or “virtual” network interface

VALUATION OF PAYPHONE ASSETS

- ◆ Asset reclassification, not sale of assets
- ◆ Reclassification value consistent with Joint Cost Order (net book value)
- ◆ Intangible contract values and advance payments are not appropriate
- ◆ Dedicated payphone assets only
 - Paystation Equipment
 - Land and Buildings
- ◆ Interest charges are not applicable

NONSTRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS

- ◆ The Coalition supports the application of nonstructural safeguards
 - Precedent of CI-III
 - Uniform cost allocation standards
 - External and internal audits
 - Price caps reduced incentive for non-compliance
- ◆ Proven effectiveness of nonstructural safeguards